A guide for social science journal editors on easing into open science.

Journal editors have a large amount of power to advance open science in their respective fields by incentivising and mandating open policies and practices at their journals. The Data PASS Journal Editors Discussion Interface (JEDI, an online community for social science journal editors: www.dpjedi.org ) has collated several resources on embedding open science in journal editing ( www.dpjedi.org/resources ). However, it can be overwhelming as an editor new to open science practices to know where to start. For this reason, we created a guide for journal editors on how to get started with open science. The guide outlines steps that editors can take to implement open policies and practices within their journal, and goes through the what, why, how, and worries of each policy and practice. This manuscript introduces and summarizes the guide (full guide: https://doi.org/10.31219/osf.io/hstcx ).

Who Wants to Enhance Their Cognitive Abilities? Potential Predictors of the Acceptance of Cognitive Enhancement.

With advances in new technologies, the topic of cognitive enhancement has been at the center of public debate in recent years. Various enhancement methods (e.g., brain stimulation, smart drugs, or working memory training) promise improvements in one's cognitive abilities such as intelligence and memory. Although these methods have been rather ineffective so far, they are largely available to the general public and can be applied individually. As applying enhancement might be accompanied by certain risks, it is important to understand which individuals seek to enhance themselves. For instance, individuals' intelligence, personality, and interests might predict their willingness to get enhanced. Thus, in a preregistered study, we asked 257 participants about their acceptance of various enhancement methods and tested predictors thereof, such as participants' psychometrically measured and self-estimated intelligence. While both measured and self-estimated intelligence as well as participants' implicit beliefs about intelligence, did not predict participants' acceptance of enhancement; a younger age, higher interest in science-fiction, and (partially) higher openness as well as lower conscientiousness did. Thus, certain interests and personality traits might contribute to the willingness to enhance one's cognition. Finally, we discuss the need for replication and argue for testing other potential predictors of the acceptance of cognitive enhancement.

Mutual interplay between cognitive offloading and secondary task performance.

Various modern tools, such as smartphones, allow for cognitive offloading (i.e., the externalization of cognitive processes). In this study, we examined the use and consequences of cognitive offloading in demanding situations in which people perform multiple tasks concurrently-mimicking the requirements of daily life. In a preregistered study, we adapted the dual-task paradigm so that one of the tasks allowed for cognitive offloading. As a primary task, our participants (N = 172) performed the pattern copy task-a highly demanding working memory task that allows for offloading at various degrees. In this task, we manipulated the temporal costs of offloading. Concurrently, half of the participants responded to a secondary N-back task. As our main research question, we investigated the impact of offloading behavior on secondary task performance. We observed that more pronounced offloading in the condition without temporal costs was accompanied by a more accurate performance in the N-back task. Furthermore, the necessity to respond to the N-back task increased offloading behavior. These results suggest an interplay between offloading and secondary task performance: in demanding situations, individuals increasingly use cognitive offloading, which releases internal resources that can then be devoted to improving performance in other, concurrent tasks.

Teaching open and reproducible scholarship: a critical review of the evidence base for current pedagogical methods and their outcomes.

In recent years, the scientific community has called for improvements in the credibility, robustness and reproducibility of research, characterized by increased interest and promotion of open and transparent research practices. While progress has been positive, there is a lack of consideration about how this approach can be embedded into undergraduate and postgraduate research training. Specifically, a critical overview of the literature which investigates how integrating open and reproducible science may influence student outcomes is needed. In this paper, we provide the first critical review of literature surrounding the integration of open and reproducible scholarship into teaching and learning and its associated outcomes in students. Our review highlighted how embedding open and reproducible scholarship appears to be associated with (i) students' scientific literacies (i.e. students' understanding of open research, consumption of science and the development of transferable skills); (ii) student engagement (i.e. motivation and engagement with learning, collaboration and engagement in open research) and (iii) students' attitudes towards science (i.e. trust in science and confidence in research findings). However, our review also identified a need for more robust and rigorous methods within pedagogical research, including more interventional and experimental evaluations of teaching practice. We discuss implications for teaching and learning scholarship.

Supporting Cognition With Modern Technology: Distributed Cognition Today and in an AI-Enhanced Future.

In the present article, we explore prospects for using artificial intelligence (AI) to distribute cognition via cognitive offloading (i.e., to delegate thinking tasks to AI-technologies). Modern technologies for cognitive support are rapidly developing and increasingly popular. Today, many individuals heavily rely on their smartphones or other technical gadgets to support their daily life but also their learning and work. For instance, smartphones are used to track and analyze changes in the environment, and to store and continually update relevant information. Thus, individuals can offload (i.e., externalize) information to their smartphones and refresh their knowledge by accessing it. This implies that using modern technologies such as AI empowers users via offloading and enables them to function as always-updated knowledge professionals, so that they can deploy their insights strategically instead of relying on outdated and memorized facts. This AI-supported offloading of cognitive processes also saves individuals' internal cognitive resources by distributing the task demands into their environment. In this article, we provide (1) an overview of empirical findings on cognitive offloading and (2) an outlook on how individuals' offloading behavior might change in an AI-enhanced future. More specifically, we first discuss determinants of offloading such as the design of technical tools and links to metacognition. Furthermore, we discuss benefits and risks of cognitive offloading. While offloading improves immediate task performance, it might also be a threat for users' cognitive abilities. Following this, we provide a perspective on whether individuals will make heavier use of AI-technologies for offloading in the future and how this might affect their cognition. On one hand, individuals might heavily rely on easily accessible AI-technologies which in return might diminish their internal cognition/learning. On the other hand, individuals might aim at enhancing their cognition so that they can keep up with AI-technologies and will not be replaced by them. Finally, we present own data and findings from the literature on the assumption that individuals' personality is a predictor of trust in AI. Trust in modern AI-technologies might be a strong determinant for wider appropriation and dependence on these technologies to distribute cognition and should thus be considered in an AI-enhanced future.

Human enhancement and personality: A new approach towards investigating their relationship.

With the rise of new technologies, also human enhancement is widely discussed. Especially the philosophical movement "transhumanism" urges for creating "better humans" by applying different enhancement methods, namely: pharmacological, current-based, and genetic enhancement as well as mind uploading. While the first three aim at enhancing human characteristics, mind uploading promises immortality by uploading one's brain onto an external storage medium. In the present study, we adapted the method of divergent thinking tasks to assess individuals' assumptions about enhancement methods. These were rated regarding their negativity/positivity and societal-/individual-orientation and then tested whether they are predicted by basic human values and selected personality traits. While individuals' values were not related to their assumptions about enhancement, openness predicted more negative assumptions about most enhancement methods, and a higher intellect predicted more societal-oriented assumptions about genetic enhancement. Furthermore, higher grandiose narcissism predicted more negative assumptions about current-based enhancement and higher psychopathic tendencies predicted more positive assumptions about genetic enhancement. Additionally, higher Machiavellianism predicted more individual-oriented assumptions about pharmacological and current-based enhancement. However, all relationships were of small effect size. We urge for further psychological research in this increasingly relevant field.

Less-Intelligent and Unaware? Accuracy and Dunning-Kruger Effects for Self-Estimates of Different Aspects of Intelligence.

People's perceptions of their intelligence correlate only moderately with objective intelligence measures. On average, people overestimate themselves. According to the popular Dunning-Kruger effect, this is particularly true for low performers: across many domains, those in the lowest quartile overestimate their abilities the most. However, recent work using improved statistical approaches found little support for a Dunning-Kruger effect in general intelligence. We investigated accuracy and Dunning-Kruger effects for self-estimates of general, verbal, numerical, and spatial intelligence-domains that differed in how well they can be judged in the past. A total of 281 participants completed self-estimates and intelligence measures online. Self-estimates showed mostly moderate correlational accuracy that was slightly higher for numerical intelligence and lower for verbal intelligence. Across domains, participants rated their intelligence as above average. However, as their intelligence was indeed high, this was not an overestimation. While standard analyses indicated Dunning-Kruger effects in general, verbal, and spatial intelligence, improved statistical methods only yielded some support for one in verbal intelligence: people with lower verbal intelligence tended to have less self-knowledge about it. The generalizability of these findings is limited to young, highly educated populations. Nevertheless, our results contribute to a growing literature questioning the generality of the Dunning-Kruger effect.

Individual differences in cognitive offloading: a comparison of intention offloading, pattern copy, and short-term memory capacity.

The cognitive load of many everyday life tasks exceeds known limitations of short-term memory. One strategy to compensate for information overload is cognitive offloading which refers to the externalization of cognitive processes such as reminder setting instead of memorizing. There appears to be remarkable variance in offloading behavior between participants which poses the question whether there is a common factor influencing offloading behavior across different tasks tackling short-term memory processes. To pursue this question, we studied individual differences in offloading behavior between two well-established offloading paradigms: the intention offloading task which tackles memory for intentions and the pattern copy task which tackles continuous short-term memory load. Our study also included an unrelated task measuring short-term memory capacity. Each participant completed all tasks twice on two consecutive days in order to obtain reliability scores. Despite high reliability scores, individual differences in offloading behavior were uncorrelated between the two offloading tasks. In both tasks, however, individual differences in offloading behavior were correlated with the individual differences in an unrelated short-term memory task. Our results therefore show that offloading behavior cannot simply be explained in terms of a single common factor driving offloading behavior across tasks. We discuss the implications of this finding for future research investigating the interrelations of offloading behavior across different tasks.

Consequences of cognitive offloading: Boosting performance but diminishing memory.

Modern technical tools such as tablets allow for the temporal externalisation of working memory processes (i.e., cognitive offloading). Although such externalisations support immediate performance on different tasks, little is known about potential long-term consequences of offloading behaviour. In the current set of experiments, we studied the relationship between cognitive offloading and subsequent memory for the offloaded information as well as the interplay of this relationship with the goal to acquire new memory representations. Our participants solved the Pattern Copy Task, in which we manipulated the costs of cognitive offloading and the awareness of a subsequent memory test. In Experiment 1 (N = 172), we showed that increasing the costs for offloading induces reduced offloading behaviour. This reduction in offloading came along with lower immediate task performance but more accurate memory in an unexpected test. In Experiment 2 (N = 172), we confirmed these findings and observed that offloading behaviour remained detrimental for subsequent memory performance when participants were aware of the upcoming memory test. Interestingly, Experiment 3 (N = 172) showed that cognitive offloading is not detrimental for long-term memory formation under all circumstances. Those participants who were forced to offload maximally but were aware of the memory test could almost completely counteract the negative impact of offloading on memory. Our experiments highlight the importance of the explicit goal to acquire new memory representations when relying on technical tools as offloading did have detrimental effects on memory without such a goal.

From metacognitive beliefs to strategy selection: does fake performance feedback influence cognitive offloading?

The ubiquitous availability of technological aids requires individuals to constantly decide between either externalizing cognitive processes into these aids (i.e. cognitive offloading) or relying on their own internal cognitive resources. With the present research, we investigated the influence of metacognitive beliefs on individuals' offloading behavior in an experimental setup (N = 159). We manipulated participants' metacognitive beliefs about their memory abilities by providing fake performance feedback: below-average feedback, above-average feedback, or no feedback (control-group). We then measured offloading behavior, using a pattern copying task in which participants copied a color pattern from a model window into a workspace window. While solving this task, participants could rely either more on an internal memory strategy or more on an offloading strategy. Fake performance feedback affected the participants' metacognitive evaluations about their memory abilities (below-group < control-group < above-group). Although fake performance feedback did not affect actual offloading behavior, the participants receiving below-average performance feedback reported that they had relied more on an offloading strategy than those participants receiving above-average performance feedback. Furthermore, the participants in the below-group reported lower general memory abilities than the other groups at the end of the experiment. We conclude that while fake performance feedback strongly influenced metacognitive beliefs, this did not transfer into a change of strategy selection, thus not influencing offloading behavior. We propose to consider not only metacognitive beliefs but also metacognitive experiences as potential determinants of cognitive offloading.

Placebo hampers ability to self-regulate brain activity: A double-blind sham-controlled neurofeedback study.

It is still poorly understood how unspecific effects peripheral to the supposed action mechanism of neurofeedback (NF) influence the ability to self-regulate one's own brain signals. Recently, skeptical researchers have even attributed the lion's part of therapeutic outcomes of NF to placebo and other psychosocial factors. Here, we investigated whether and by which mechanisms unspecific factors influence neural self-regulation during NF. To manipulate the impact of unspecific influences on NF performance, we used a sham transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) as active placebo intervention suggesting positive effects on NF performance. Our results show that the expectation of receiving brain stimulation, which should boost neural self-regulation, interferes with the ability to self-regulate the sensorimotor rhythm in the EEG. Hence, these results provide evidence that placebo reduces NF performance, and thereby challenge current theories on unspecific effects related to NF.